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Abstract 
It is shown that the ability of the interval 
probability representation to capture episte­
mological independence is severely limited. 
Two events are epistemologically indepen­
dent if knowledge of the first event does not 
alter belief (i.e., probability bounds) about 
the second. However, independence in this 
form can only exist in a 2-monotone probabil­
ity function in degenerate cases- i.e., if the 
prior bounds are either point probabilities or 
entirely vacuous. Additional limitations are 
characterized for other classes of lower prob­
abilities as well. It is argued that these phe­
nomena are a matter of interpretation. They 
appear to be limitations when one interprets 
probability bounds as a measure of epistemo­
logical indeterminacy (i.e., uncertainty aris­
ing from a lack of knowledge), but are ex­
actly as one would expect when probability 
intervals are interpreted as representations of 
ontological indeterminacy (indeterminacy in­
troduced by structural approximations). 
1 Introduction 
Let (!J, :F) be a probability space, and let E. ,  P 
:F --+ [0, 1] be set-functions on this space satisfy­
ing the following properties for any A, B E :F with 
An B = 0: 
1. p (0) = p (0) = 1, p (!J) = p (!J) :::= 1 
2. P (A) + P (A) = I 
3. P (A)+ P (B):::; P (AU B) 
4. P (A)+ P (B) 2: P (AU B) 
(Super-additivity) 
(Sub-additivity) 
where A denotes !J- A, the complement of A. Then P 
and P are called lower and upper probability functions 
respectively. It is always the case that P (A):::; P (A). 
It is only necessary to store one or the other of E. and 
P , since each can be obtained using Property 2 once 
the other is known. The lower and upper probabil­
ity envelopes of a non-empty set of distributions P on 
en 1 :F) are functionS 
P (A)= inf{P(A): PEP} 
P (A) = sup{P(A) :PEP} 
(1a) 
(lb) 
Every lower (upper) probability envelope is a lower 
(upper) probability. Thus, the lower probability rep­
resentation provides a convenient description of a set 
of distributions. 
A number of uses have been suggested for lower prob­
abilities, and their use is rapidly increasing. Some feel 
that the use of a single exact distribution in Bayesian­
style inference fails to satisfactorily distinguish be­
tween uncertainty and ignorance or between certainty 
and confidence , and therefore a more general repre­
sentation such as lower probability functions may be 
a superior representation of belief [21, 22, 24, 32, 33]. 
Lower probabilities may also arise from incomplete or 
partial elicitation, such as when insufficient knowledge 
is available, or when it is too time consuming to obtain 
obtain the necessary knowledge to warrant the preci­
sion inherent in exact probabilities [2, 16, 18]. Lower 
probabilities are also useful for studying sensitivity and 
robustness in probabilistic inference [1, 36, 40], and 
they can be used to weigh computation effort against 
modeling precision [9]. They arise in group decision 
problems [24, 28] and in axiomatic approaches to un­
certainty when the axioms of probability are weakened 
[17, 26, 33, 36]. They arise when determining con­
straints on probabilities given only the probabilities 
on a finite set of other events [14, 27]. Finally, they 
may result from the abstraction of more detailed prob­
abilistic models [5, 6, 19]. 
This paper examines a particular problem that arises 
with the use of lower probability functions when we at­
tempt to model independent events. We limit our con­
sideration to Bayesian-style updating of lower proba­
bility functions, such that when evidence E C Q is 
learned, each distribution in P is updated according 
to Bayes's rule, yielding the new updated bounds 
E. (AlE)= inf{P(AIE) :PEP, P(E) > 0} 
P (AlE) = sup{P(AIE): PEP, P(E) > 0} (2) 
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It is often impossible to capture epistemological m­
dependence within a lower probability representation 
([36] uses the term epzstemic independence. Here we 
follow [37] by using the term epistemologica0. Two 
events being epistemologically independent would im­
ply that learning the truth about the first should 
not alter belief (i.e ., probability bounds) on the sec­
ond. Specifically, if the initial lower probability is 2-
monotone (defined later), we show that epistemologi­
cal independence cannot be captured unless we are in 
one of the degenerate cases where P = P (i.e . ,  the 
point probability case) or P = 0 and P = 1 (the vac­
uous case). We also characterize other circumstances 
in which a lower probability cannot capture this type 
of independence. 
We argue that the apparent inability of lower proba­
bilities to capture independence is a matter of inter­
pretation. Although we have specified that the bounds 
arise as extrema of P, we have not specified why a set 
of distributions should be considered in the first place. 
The apparent difficulty arises from an implicit assump­
tion that the set of distributions is used to represent 
some form of epistemological indeterminacy- that is, 
a degree of knowledge or the lack of knowledge about 
the true situation. The qualitative properties of the 
lower probability representation, particularly with re­
spect to representing independence, but also in terms 
of related phenomena such as dilation [29], make it 
poorly matched for epistemologically-based interpre­
tations. We propose instead an alternative interpreta­
tion, whereby the bounds arise as a result of ontological 
(i.e. , structural) considerations. In our interpretation , 
(point) probabilities capture the epistemological inde­
terminacy, but (approximate) structural assumptions 
placed on a model from above introduce additional in­
determinacy with a qualitatively different nature, one 
in which the behavior of the bounds under condition­
ing can be logically interpreted. 
2 Coin Tossing Example 
Suppose we have two coins which we consider to be 
physically independent of each other. We are going to 
toss both coins and observe their outcomes. Each coin 
has only two possibilities, {heads , tails}, and each has 
its own (unrelated) bias on the probability of landing 
heads, which we know only to be between 1/4 and 3/4. 
First , we wish to characterize our knowledge using a 
lower probability function. We denote the four possi­
ble outcomes as n = {hth2, hti2, ith2, iti2}· 
Since it may be the case that both coins have a 1/4 
probability of heads, we assign E._({h1h2}) = 1/16. 
Similarly, they may both have a 3/4 probability of 
coming up heads, so we assign P ({h1h2}) = 9/16. 
Carrying out this logic for all of the 16 possible sets of 
outcomes, we obtain the bounds in Figure 1. 
Let P( P ) denote the set of all probability distribu­
tions consistent with the bounds in Figure 1 - i.e., 
For the sets: p p 
f/J 0 0 
{h1h2J, {h1t2}, {t1h2}, or {t1t2} 1/16 9/16 
{hth2, htt2},
_
{ith2, itt2}, {hth2, ith2} 1 3 
or {h1t2, t1t2} 4 4 
{h1h2, t1t2} or {h1t2, t1h2} 3/8 5/8 
thlt2, ith2, iti2�. {hth2, ith2, iti2}, 7 15 
{h1h2, h1t2, t1t2}, or {h1h2, h1t2, t1h2} I6 16 
n = {h1h2, h1t2, h2t1. t1t2} 1 1 
Figure 1: Bounds on the possible joint outcomes of 
two coins. 
For the sets: p p 
1/J, {t1h2}, {t1t2}, or {t1h2, t1t2} 0 0 
thth2}, {hti�}, {hth2, ithd 
1 7 {hti2 , iti2}, {hth2, iti2}, {hti2, ith2} 8 8 
{h1t2, t1h2, t1t2}, or {h1h2, t1h2, t1t2} 
thth2, htt2}, {
_
hth2, hti2, tlt2}, 
{hth2, h1t2, t1h2}, or 1 1 
Q = {hth2,hti2,tth2,tlt2} 
Figure 2: Bounds after conditioning on H1 
{hth2, htt2}-
P E P(P ) if and only if P (A) :S P(A) :S P (A) for 
all A C fl. 
Suppose we observe the outcome of the first coin to 
be heads without observing the outcome of the sec­
ond coin. This gives us the conditioning event H1 = 
{h1h2, h1t2}· We then update our bounds given the 
new evidence as follows: 
P (AIHt) = inf{P(AIHt) : P E P(P ) , P(Ht) > 0} 
P (AIHt) = sup{P(AIHt) : P E P(P ), P (Ht) > 0} 
(3) 
This yields the new bounds shown in Figure 2. Notice 
the new bounds for the event H2 = {hth2, t1h2}, which 
were previously [1/4, 3/4], but are now [1/8, 7/8]. The 
outcomes of the two coins are supposedly indepen­
dent, yet learning the outcome of the first coin had 
a marked influence on our beliefs about the outcome 
of the second (independent) coin. The representation 
has clearly failed to capture the independence. 
The inability to capture this independence is related 
to the fact that P(P ) includes distributions in which 
the coins are not independent . Using the set 
P = {P({x1x2}) = Pt({xt})P2({x2}): x stands for 
h or t, 1/4:::; P;( {ht}) :::; 3/4, i = 1, 2} (4) 
would more accurately reflect the complete knowledge 
in this example. This is what [36] calls the sensitivity 
analysis approach to independence, and [11) call type-
1 independence. This (non-convex) set of probabilities 
is shown graphically in Figure 3. For this set, P (Hz), 
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�(t.l hlJ 
Figure 3: The set P shown graphically. Because the 
probabilities of the four outcomes must sum to one 
in each probability distribution, we can plot each dis­
tribution as a point in three dimensions. The set 
P resembles a piece twisted of paper. It is non­
convex - for example, (1/16, 3/16,3/16, 9/16) and 
(9/16, 3/16, 3/16,1/16) are in P, but their average, 
(5/16, 3/16,3/16, 5/16) is not. 
as defined by ( 1) and shown in Figure 1, is equal to 
P (H2IH1), as defined by (2), so a perfect representa­
tion of P would capture the independence. However, 
a primary reason for studying the lower probability 
representation is for the purpose of using it as a com­
plete representation of belief. Because independence 
plays a central role in many theories of subjective be­
lief, the fact that the lower probability representation 
has problems capturing independence is significant. In 
the remainder of the paper, we will characterize this 
(in)ability to capture independence and examine what 
this suggests for the interpretation of the representa­
tion. 
3 Lower Probability 
Before examining the independence issues in more de­
tail, this section defines some notation and reviews 
some of the basics of the lower probability repre­
sentation. The subsequent section characterizes in­
dependence issues. The properties and terminology 
in this section has been developed and utilized by 
[3 , 4, 7, 36, 37] and others. 
A lower probability is a function obeying the proper­
ties listed in the introduction. A probability distribu­
tion, P, is consistent with a lower probability P if for 
every A E :F, P (A) :S P(A). We denote by P(P ) the 
set of all distributions consistent with £ . The con­
ditions in the introduction are not strong enough to 
ensure that P(P ) i= 0. A lower probability P1 domi­
nates P2 if for all A E :F, P1 (A)� P2 (A) ;in which 
case P(P1 ) c P(P2 ). 
- -
Denote the lower probability envelope P obtained 
from P using (la) by P [P]. It does not follow that 
P(E_ (P]) = P. In other words, many different sets of 
distributions share the same bounds. The set P(P [P]) 
is called the maJ·arization of P. When P ( P [P]) = P, 
P is said to be closed to majorization ([39]). When 
P = P , then P is a probability distribution. 
Every lower probability function is monotone (some­
times called 1-monotone), meaning that P (A) :S 
P (B) whenever A C B. A stronger property called 
2-monotonicity is often usefuL A lower probability E._ 
is 2-monotone when for every A, B E F, 
P (A)+ P (B) :S P (An B)+ P (AU B) 
Two-monotonicity is a sufficient (but not necessary) 
condition to ensure that £ is a lower envelope. Two­
monotonicity is usually necessary for obtaining ex­
act dosed-form manipulation formula, and is therefore 
usually assumed in practice. 
The lower and upper probabilities conditioned on 
event E E :F are given by 
P (AlE) = inf{P (AIE) : P E P(P ), P(E) > 0} 
P (AlE) = sup{P(AIE) : P E P(P ), P(E) > 0} 
It is well-known [7, 13, 15, 38, 39] that when E. 1s 
2-monotonc, 
p (AlE)-
£(An E) 
- - P (A n E) + P (A n E) 
p (AlE)- p (An E) (5) - P (An E)+ P (An E) 
whenever £ (E) > 0, and P (AlE) = 1 whenever A C 
E and P (E) > £(E) == 0. If P (E) = 0, then the 
conditional lower probability is undefined. 
Let f2 be finite, :F = 2°. The Mobius transform of P 
is a set function m : :F --+ lR defined by ((30, pg. 391) 
m(A)::::: L (-l)IA-Bip (B) 
BCA 
If m(A) � 0 for all A E F, then P is said to be 
a belief function. Belief functions are used by the 
Dempster-Shafer theory ([30]) and in the Transferable 
Belief Model ([32]), but in those theories are given ev­
idential interpretations rather than the lower proba­
bilistic interpretation of interest here (see [20] and [31] 
for good discriptions of the difference). Belief func­
tions are also what [4] terms infinitely-monotone ca­
pacities ([34]). Every infinitely-monotone lower prob­
ability (i.e., belief function) is also 2-monotone, but 
the converse does not hold. 
The Mobius transform is information preserving, so 
that the original function can be recovered from m 
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using the inverse Mobius transform, given by 
P (A)= L m(B) 
BCA 
Subsets A E F with m(A) -=f 0 are called the focal 
elements of P . 
Let P A and P B  be lower probabilities on 0 A and 
OB respectiveV. The meta-Markov combination of 
P A and P B ( [10]), denoted P = P (P A ) @ P (PB ), 
is the set of distributions on 0 = 0 A ---x-?lB given by 
p = {p: P({ab}) = PA({a})PB({b}), } 
PA E P (PA ),P B  E P (PB) 
This is the set consisting of all independent events, i.e., 
the set shown in Figure 3 for the coin tossing example. 
We also write P = P A @ P B  for the majorization of 
this set. 
- -
4 Representation of Independence 
Probabilistic independence of A and B is characterized 
by either of two properties: 
1. P (A n B) = P(A)P (B) 
2. P(A/B) = P(A) when P(B) > 0 
In the case of a probability distribution each of these 
imply the other. It is not hard to see that in the case 
of lower probabilities the two properties do not imply 
each other, and therefore it seems natural to define 
independence for lower probabilities as the conjunc­
tion of both properties, i.e., A and B are independent 
whenever 
1. P (A/B) = P (A) and P (A/B) = P (A), 
when P (B) > 0 (irrelevance) 
2. P (An B)= P (A)P (B) and 
P (An B) = P (A)P (B) (factorization) 
In fact, [37] give exactly this definition. However, as 
the subsequent theorems show, the two are often mu­
tually incompatible. 
Theorem 1 When P is 2-monotone, the following 
conditions cannot all hold: 
1. P (A)= P (A/B) 
2. P (An B)= P (A)P (B) and 
P (An B)= P (A)P (B). 
3. 0 < P (A) < 1 
4. P (B) > P (B), 
where P (A/B) = inf{P (A/B) : P E P(P ), P (B) > 
0} and A, B C fl. If any one of the four properties is 
removed, the three remaining properties can co-exist. 
The above shows that a 2-monotone lower probability 
cannot exhibit the desired properties of independence 
except in the degenerate cases where P (A) = 0 or 
P (A)= 1, i.e., when P is entirely uninformative (vac­
uous) about A, or when P (B) = P (B) (i.e., P (B) 
is a point probability on B). 
We can demonstrate the applicability of the above the­
orem on the following example. 
Example 1: [The Extended Monte Hall Problem) 
Jane is a contestant on Let's Make a Deal, a game 
show. Presented with four curtains, behind only one 
of which is a prize, she selects Curtain 1. The host 
then reveals first that there is nothing behind Cur­
tain 4, and second that there is nothing behind Cur­
tain 3. Making the assumptions that initially the lo­
cation of the prize is equiprobable, that the host will 
always show two empty unselected curtains, that the 
unselected curtain not revealed is chosen uniformly, 
that the curtain order is independent of all other as­
pects of the problem, and that her knowledge about 
how the curtain order is picked is characterized by 
a vacuous lower probability, what is the lower prob­
ability of winning if she does not change her selec­
tion? What is the lower probability of winning if she 
does change selection? Assume Jane initially captures 
all the knowledge of the problem using only a lower 
probability distribution, and that the frame of dis­
cernment used includes the curtain order (so that n = 
{123,132,124,142,134,143,234,243,324,342,423,432} 
where ijk abbreviates "the prize is behind i, the host 
reveals first j and second k). 
The information stated above is encoded in the lower 
probability function with the Mobius transform focal 
elements 
m( {123, 132}) = m( { 124, 142}) = m( {134, 143}) = 1/12 
m( {234, 243}) = m( {324, 342}) = m( { 423, 432}) = 1/4 
(6) 
The initial lower probability is in this case a belief 
function, and therefore 2-monotone. Conditions 1, 2, 
4, and 5 of Theorem 1 are satisfied, so by observing 
the order in which the curtains are revealed, we know 
her lower probability for each of the two questions is 
effected. In particular, after observing the revealed 
curtains and their order, her remaining belief becomes 
vacuous, i.e., 
P ( {134, 143} /{143, 243}) = P ( {234, 243} 1{ 143, 243}) = o 
P ( { 134, 143} /{143, 243}) = P ( {234, 243} 1{ 143, 243}) = 1 
Had she ignored curtain order entirely, using fl = 
{ 12, 13, 14, 21, 31,41}, where ij abbreviates "the prize 
is behind i ,  the host does not reveal j ," her final be­
liefs (according to Bayes's rule) are that she'd have 
a point-probability of 3/4 of winning if she changes 
her selection, or a point-probability of 1/4 if she does 
not change. Once again, the result should be com­
pletely independent of the curtain order, but in the 
Independence with Lower and Upper Probabilities 173 
lower probability representation the influence can be 
quite dramatic. D 
Theorem 1 covers a wide class of lower probabilities 
that are of great interest. However, there are in ad­
dition lower probability functions that are not even 
2-monotone, but for which independence properties 
cannot hold. The lower probability in the initial coin 
tossing example (Figure 1) was such an example - it 
is not 2-monotone. Therefore, it is possible to obtain 
further characterizations for when the independence 
properties cannot co-exist. The following characteri­
zation covers the coin tossing example. 
Theorem 2 Suppose P(£. ) is the set of distributions 
consistent with E. I and let A, B c n. If there exists 
a P E P(P ) such that P(A) = P (A), P(B) > 0 and 
P(A) > P(AIB), then P (A) > P (AlB). 
Dually, if there exists a P E P(P ) such that P(A) = 
P (A) and P(A) < P(AIB)� then P (A)< P (AlB). 
That Theorem 2 covers the initial coin tossing ex­
ample is immediately seen with the distribution 
(1/16, 3/8, 3/16, 3/8), which is consistent with the 
bounds in Figure 1 and satisfies the conditions in The­
orem 2. 
Theorem 2 is closely related to [29, Theorems 2 and 3] 
which state virtually identical conditions under which 
B will dilate the lower probability bounds (i.e., the 
posterior bounds after updating on B will strictly con­
tain the prior bounds). Clearly, if the bounds dilate 
on an event that is supposed to be independent, the 
lower probability is not exhibiting the independence 
properties. However, the connection between dilation 
and independence is actually closer than this. For ex­
ample, [29, Theorem 1] shows that dilation can only 
occur if the set of distributions with the desired in­
dependence property intersects the set of consistent 
distributions. The following theorem emphasizes this 
connection between the independence properties and 
dilation - independent events cannot cause a set of 
independent distributions to contract. 
Theorem 3 Let P = P A @ PB 1 with P (AlB) 
given by (2). (Similarly for P ). Then for A = 
A' X nB and B = nA X B', where A' c nA and 
B' cOB: 
1. P (An B)= P (A)P (B) 
2. P (An B) = P (A)P (B) 
3. P (AlB) :::; P (A) :::; P (A) :::; P (AlB) 
In addition to the connection with dilation (Items 3 
and 4), Items 1 and 2 of Theorem 3 demonstrate that 
the factorization property of independence is always 
a property of lower probabilities when we are dealing 
with independent events. Recall that these conditions 
appeared in Theorem 1. 
The idea that information about one fact should not 
influence beliefs regarding certain other facts is an im­
portant component in many formalizations of knowl­
edge representation. The theorems in this section 
demonstrate that the lower probability representation 
often cannot exhibit this property except in degenerate 
cases. 
An alternative version of epistemological independence 
is possible. Instead of requiring that independent 
events do not affect conditioned probability bounds, 
events can be called independent whenever P (AlB) :::; 
P (B). This version is identified by [12, Definition 4.3] 
with the rationale that independent events should not 
contribute additional information, a requirement that 
is much weaker than the irrelevance requirement. This 
weaker requirement is compatible with the factoriza­
tion property and, as evidenced by the results of 
this section, is a preferable property for independence 
within the lower probability framework. It also should 
be noted that while [37] define independence as hav­
ing both properties hold, [36] defines epistemological 
independence as the first property (irrelevance) only. 
5 Abstraction 
This section examines factorization and the relation­
ship between a factored lower probability and its con­
sistent probability distributions. This relationship is 
central to the interpretation of lower probability con­
sidered in the subsequent section. 
Let P* be an arbitrary probability distribution on 0 = 
n A X nB. Specifically, it is not necessarily the case 
that A ll B[P*] (that A is independent of B with 
respect to P*). 
Definition 1 A lower probability P on 0 is an ab­
straction of P* relative to the assertion A ll B when 
1. P* EP(P) 
2. P = PA @PB 
where p A is a lower probability on n A I PB is a 
lower probability on OB. P is a proper abstraction 
if it is not dominated by any other abstraction of P* 
relatzve to A ll B. 
It is worth emphasizing that an abstraction is factoriz­
able (Item 2) and captures information about p• with­
out introducing information that is not implied by P*. 
No abstraction can capture strictly more information 
than a proper abstraction without introducing infor­
mation that is not implied by p•; however, a proper 
abstraction is not unique - there may be an arbitrar­
ily large number of proper abstractions relative to a 
single independence assertion, and each of these may 
contain information not contained by the others. Note 
that by definition, any abstraction is closed to ma­
jorization. 
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Theorem 3 has already revealed that P (A n B) = 
P (A)P (B). This does not, however, describe the 
lower probability of non-rectangular sets (those which 
cannot be written as Ax B). The full characterization 
of all sets is most conveniently stated in terms of the 
Mobius transform. 
Theorem 4 If P is an abstraction of a distribution 
P relative to A Jl B, and m is the Mobius transform 
of P, then 
m(X) = { :A(A)ma(B) h 
X= A X B, w en A C 0 B C 0 
otherwise 
A' B 
where m A and mB are the Mobius transforms of P A 
and PB , PA (A) = P (A x Os), and PB (B) 
P(OAxBT 
-
Theorem 4 does not reqmre the abstraction to be 
proper. 
It is possible to generalize the concept of an abstrac­
tion relative to a single independence assertion to the 
concept of an abstraction relative to a set of con­
ditional independence assertions. This introduces a 
number of complications beyond the scope of the cur­
rent paper. A general concept of factorization ( decom­
position) of lower probabilities is developed in [8]. 
The concept of a proper abstraction immediately 
suggests an interpretation for probability bounds -
namely, that a lower probability is an abstraction of 
some (more detailed) probability distribution. The ex­
act identity of this distribution is lost - it is known 
only to be in P(P ) . The next section develops this 
interpretation. 
6 The Ontological Interpretation 
This section introduces an interpretation of lower 
probability. This interpretation resolves many of the 
apparent limitations discussed above, and provides an 
interpretation that suggests important uses for lower 
probabilities. 
Let us assume that a probability or a lower probabil­
ity function is to serve as a model of some system or 
phenomena, as is often the case. Models are by their 
very nature approximations or abstractions of the ac­
tual system being modeled, and as such they bring 
with them a certain amount of indeterminacy. By in­
cluding probabilities or lower probabilities in the de­
scription of the model, we often aim to quantify this 
indeterminacy explicitly. 
Constructing a model of a system involves two basic 
steps: (1) Choosing an ontology, and (2) Filling in 
the knowledge required by the ontology. An ontol­
ogy specifies the language used to describe the system, 
as well as structural and parametric assumptions that 
are built into the model. We can think of an ontol­
ogy as identifying a set of parameters that must be 
filled in to specify the actual knowledge of the partic­
ular system being modeled, as well as a set of variables 
that are used to describe particular problem instances. 
The ontology (alone) leaves the values of the param­
eters unspecified, for this is the epistemological infor­
mation. Once the parameters are specified, the model 
is completely specified, and the ontology relates these 
parameters to each other and to the problem instance 
variables. We refer to these two levels as the ontologi­
cal level and the epistemological level. 
In the case where two coins are tossed, choices at the 
ontological level include assuming that exactly one of 
only two possible outcomes can occur for each coin, 
that the outcome of each coin can be characterized by a 
single probability, that outcomes of consecutive tosses 
are independent of one another and of the other coin. 
These correspond to choices of language, parametric 
assumptions, and structural assumptions respectively. 
This ontology requires two parameters to be filled in to 
completely specify the model. The values for the two 
coins' biases are the knowledge at the epistemological 
level. 
Indeterminacy in a model can arise at either level, and 
we refer to these as ontological indeterminacy or epis­
temological indeterminacy (these terms were coined by 
[37]). However, ontological indeterminacy can only ex­
ist when there is epistemological indeterminacy, be­
cause otherwise our model is nothing more than an 
exact description of the true situation. 
Probability provides a very good representation for 
epistemological indeterminacy. We argue, therefore, 
that (non-point) lower probabilities are inappropri­
ate for quantifying pure epistemological indetermi­
nacy. This viewpoint is much along the lines of a strict 
"Bayesian" interpretation of probability, and in stark 
contrast to epistemological interpretations of proba­
bility bounds offered by [18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25], and 
others, in which imprecision arises from a deficiency of 
knowledge or training data. Under our proposed inter­
pretation, interval probability bounds arise only as a 
result of ontological indeterminacy, i.e., structural as­
sertions that are only approximately true. Thus, when 
given a lower probability function, we immediately in­
terpret non-point intervals as a reflection of ontologi­
cal indeterminacy, and probabilities as a reflection of 
epistemological indeterminacy. 
The relationship between epistemological and ontolog­
ical indeterminacy can be visualized as follows. The 
epistemological indeterminacy of a rational, coherent 
agent is quanitified by a probability distribution P*. 
p• can be thought of as the agent's deepest beliefs, 
but these might not be easily accessible to a resource­
bounded agent. Inferences are performed using a 
model that includes ontological assumptions conve­
nient for the problem(s) being solved. The model used 
by the agent is an abstraction of P* relative to the on­
tology's independence assertions. Ideally it is a proper 
abstraction so that a minimal amount of additional in-
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determinacy is introduced by the abstraction. 
It has been said that "the assumption of conditional 
independence is usually false" (35). By asserting a con­
ditional independence assertion, an agent is more typ­
ically asserting a belief that two events are almost con­
ditionally independent given a third. An agent might 
assume, for example, that gravitational acceleration is 
independent of an object's height because it results in a 
useful model, even though deep down at the epistemo­
logical level the agent does not believe they are truly 
independent. The result of this structural approxima­
tion is that ontological indeterminacy is introduced. 
6.1 Coin Tossing Revisited 
It is instructive to apply this interpretation to the coin 
tossing example considered earlier. Consider the prob­
ability distribution, P*, given by 
P"({hlh2}) = p•({tlt2}) = 7/16 
P*( {t1h2}) = P*( {h1t2}) = 1/16 (7) 
This probability distribution quantifies epistemologi­
cal indeterminacy. Since there is no structure (i.e., 
no independence or parametric restriction), there is 
no ontological indeterminacy, so the point probability 
on the joint space captures all the agent's uncertainty. 
If a rational agent had unlimited time and resources 
to access and compute the ramifications of its deep­
est beliefs, P* is the full assessment of beliefs it would 
obtain. 
However, suppose the agent models the coins as in­
dependent. From (7), it is clear the agent does not 
really believe the coins to be independent - this is a 
structural approximation. There are several possible 
rationale for the agent imposing this artificial struc­
ture on its model: to simplify (factorize) computation, 
to reduce the number of parameters that must be as­
sessed, to obtain a structure that is better suited for 
explanation, to reason at different hierarchical levels 
of abstraction, etc. 
The agent adopts (or subjectively estimates) a proper 
abstraction of P* relative to this independence asser­
tion. An infinite number of proper abstractions are 
possible, one of which is obtained by setting P (H1) = 
E.. (H2) = P (T1) = E.. (T2) = 1/4, which is shown in 
Figure 4. The lower probability in Figure 1 contains 
Mobius assignments on two non-rectangular sets, but 
is otherwise comparable to the lower probability of Fig­
ure 4. In [12], de Campos and Huete call Figure 4 a 
type-2 product, and Figure 1 a type-1 product, and 
relate the two with their Proposition 3.6. 
When inference is performed using E.. , one should not 
assume anything about p• except what is implied as a 
result of P being an abstraction of P*. So, for exam­
ple, P is also a proper abstraction of the distribution 
P({h1h2}) = P({t1t2}) = 1/16 
(8) 
For the sets: p p 
ll'l 0 0 
{h1h2}, {h1t2}, {t1h2} or {ht2} 1/16 9/16 
{hlh2, hlt2},_{tth2, tlt2} , {hlh2, ith2} 
or {h1t2 , t1t2} 1/4 3/4 
{h1h2, ittz} or {h1t2, t1h2l_ 1/8 7/8 
thlt2, ith2, itt2t, {hth2, ith2, tlt2}, 7 15 
{h1h2, h1t2, t1t2} or {h1h2 , h1t2, t1h2} i6 16 
0 = {hlh2, hlt2, ith2, itt2} 1 1 
Figure 4: Bounds encoding ontological indeterminacy 
for two independent coins. 
Any inference from P should be valid for P as well as 
for p•. 
Suppose the agent observes the outcome of the first 
coin to be heads, without observing the outcome 
of the second coin. P (H2 IH1 ) should bound the 
conditional probability P(H21Ht) for any more de­
tailed probabilistic model, and the bound must be 
valid for any consistent distribution. For example, 
P*(H2IH1) = 7/8, but if P is the distribution of (8) 
then P(H2 IH1) = 1/8. In full, the desired conditional 
lower probability is indeed that given by (3) and shown 
in Figure 2. In other words, under the ontological in­
terpretation of lower probability, the bounds that pre­
viously seemed to present a paradox are in fact the 
desired conditional bounds. These new bounds are 
guaranteed to be consistent wit.h any ( ontologically) 
more detailed model. 
The apparent paradox with the coin tossing example 
of Section 2 only appears paradoxical because of an 
implicit assumption that the lower probabilities are 
representing a form of epistemological indeterminacy. 
By interpreting the intervals of a lower probability as 
representing ontological indeterminacy, the results of 
conditioning are precisely what we would expect and 
desire. 
6.2 Monte Hall Revisited 
In the Monte Hall example, observing the order in 
which curtains are revealed causes Jane's belief about 
the prize's location to change from a point probabil­
ity to total ignorance. This occurs despite the fact 
that curtain order is modeled as independent of the 
prize's location. This result, however, is quite reason­
able when the lower probability is given an ontological 
interpretation. We must assume that independence 
between curtain order and prize location is imposed in 
order to factorize the lower probability. Furthermore, 
they are not independent at the epistemological level, 
for if they were, the belief would be characterized by 
point bounds. 
The lower probability of (6) is an abstraction of a more 
refined model in which the host encodes the exact lo­
cation of the prize with the selection of curtain order. 
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For example, if the prize is behind the lower numbered 
unrevealed curtain, the curtains opened are revealed 
with the lowest numbered revealed first. This more 
refined model is certainly consistent with (6), as is the 
one where the encoding is reversed. 
By adopting the beliefs in (6), Jane must believe that 
deep down, given enough time and thought, she can 
figure out how the host encodes the prize's location. 
The vacuous bounds simply indicate that the use of 
a more detailed model is certainly warranted for this 
problem. The assertion that the identity of the curtain 
not revealed is independent of the order the curtains 
are revealed hardly an approximation- it is blatantly 
false - and as a result, vacuous bounds result. 
7 Conclusion 
Lower probabilities are utilized for a great number of 
purposes within the robust statistics and uncertain in­
ference communities. 
However, the results here demonstrate that the rep­
resentation has significant limitations in its ability to 
represent epistemological independence, the idea that 
knowledge of one event should not influence belief 
about a second event. Theorem 1 showed that inde­
pendence of this type can never be represented by a 
2-monotone lower probability unless the bounds are 
tight (i.e., a point probability), or the bounds are to­
tally vacuous. Theorem 2 shows that this limitation 
extends to an even wider class of lower probabilities, 
and Figure 3 suggests the limitations extend even to 
more general representations of convex sets of proba­
bility distributions. 
These limitations almost appear to be paradoxical. 
However, they are only paradoxes when one interprets 
probability bounds as an indication of epistemological 
indeterminacy. For example, one often sees it said that 
lower probabilities are useful because point probabil­
ities require more precision than available knowledge 
warrants. The results deal a blow to epistemologi­
cal interpretations such as this. When lower probabil­
ity is appropriately interpreted, these limitations and 
the unusual influence of independent events on prob­
ability bounds is entirely natural and fully consistent 
with the interpretation. The ontological interpretation 
says simply that epistemological indetermancy (uncer­
tainty due to lack of total knowledge) is appropriately 
represented by a pure probability distribution. When 
structural approximations are asserted, ontological in­
determinacy is introduced. The lower probability rep­
resentation captures this ontological indeterminacy. 
Several other concepts of independence for lower and 
upper probabilities, as well as for more general sets 
of probabilities, are also possible ([11, 12]). There 
are also several possible types of products that can 
be formed from marginal lower probability representa­
tions, and these result in various relationships between 
independence concepts and product formula. These 
relationships are studied in [12] and [36, Section 9.3]. 
In some cases it may be appropriate for an agent to 
fully assess its epistemological indeterminacy, thus ob­
taining a probability distribution P*, and then only 
later abstract this to a lower probability relative to a 
more structured or simplified model. This form of hier­
archical reasoning can reduce the computational effort 
for solving specific inferences considerably. Further­
more, for any given inference, the bounds obtained give 
a quantitative indication of how much precision was 
lost by using the abstract model, and this in turn gives 
an indication of whether an answer from the current 
level of abstraction is sufficient. However, fully assess­
ing epstemological indeterminacy first is not entirely 
necessary. It is also conceivable that bounds them­
selves are subjectively estimated without first estimat­
ing P*, perhaps by considering only the most extreme 
situations that violate structural approximations. A 
precise interpretation is important when making such 
subjective assessments, since it provides a conceptual 
basis for chasing specific bounds. 
Concepts of independence are central to probabilistic 
reasoning, and are especially important when it comes 
to scaling to large domains. A thorough understand­
ing of independence and how it can be properly utilized 
is equally important to lower probabilistic reasoning. 
The ontological interpretation may provide a useful 
foundation for utilizing abstraction and structural ap­
proximation in the context of probabilistic inference, 
ideas that are also important when scaling probabilis­
tic inference to very large domains. 
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